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The Supreme Court, Sexual Citizenship and the Idea of
Progress
KENDALL THOMAS*
Is American Progressive Constitutionalism dead.., yet? I propose to
seek the beginnings of an answer to this question in the pages of a recent
decision by the United States Supreme Court. I do feel obliged to say this,
not because I am committed to a court-centered adjudicative conception of
American constitutionalism; to the contrary. But rather, because the
decision on which I want to focus seems to me to offer a rich resource for
critical reflection on the idea of self-government whose connections to
Progressive Constitutionalism give us our topic this afternoon.
During its 1995-96 term the U.S. Supreme Court plunged for the second
time in ten years into the heavy current of contemporary American sexual
politics. In Romer v. Evans the Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause
to invalidate an amendment, Amendment Two to the Colorado
Constitution, that forbade the enactment, adoption, or enforcement of laws
or policies prohibiting discrimination based on homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct practices, or relationships. Within days after
the Court announced its judgment, the Evans opinion generated a flurry of
criticism. In the popular press the critical response to the Evans decision
spanned a broad by ideological spectrum. At one end were those
commentators who thought the decision indefensible at every level. David
Frum argued that Evans was a lamentable instance of suspect jurisprudence.
For James Kilpatrick the decision was nothing less than a blow to the
democratic process. Paul Craig Roberts warned that the decision had left
tarring and feathering the only recourse for people beset with tyrannical and
lawless judges. Other commentators applauded the results in Evans, but
voiced doubts about the soundness of the constitutional analysis on which
the Evans Court based its decision. Writing in the Washington Times, Bruce
Fine commended the Court's holding, but thought the majority had based
its decision on the wrong reasons. Stewart Taylor found the opinion both
immensely inspiring and intensely troubling. Although he praised the Evans
Court for its overdue embrace of simple justice for gay people, Taylor could
not countenance the crude, superficial and evasive legal reasoning of Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court, which, he feared might not only damage
the Court's moral authority, but set back the cause of gay rights.
In the months since the Evans decision, a number of constitutional
scholars have added their voices to the chorus of critical assessment. Some
of these accounts reject both the decision's reasoning and result. Other
scholars have defended the Court's result, but only after supplying what
Lynn A. Baker has called "the missing pages of evidence."
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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What unites these very different perspectives is a reliance on two core
premises. The first is that the central issue in Evans has to do with
individual rights. The second is the common location of this right with
concomitant approval or condemnation in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. These premises are not universally
shared and there are some exceptions. Starting from this twofold conceptual
consensus, however, most of the scholarly writing on Evans has thus far
confined itself to defending or attacking, on this or that theory, the Court's
conclusion made that Amendment Two was an unconstitutional invasion
of rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. I shall confine myself
here to a couple of representative examples. Daniel Farber and Susanna
Sherry read Evans as a judicial vindication of the Pariah Principle, which
holds that government cannot grant any group as unworthy to participate
in civil society.' This principle, they write, is at the heart of the Evans
Court's declaration that Amendment Two has the peculiar property of
imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group
and is thus an exceptional and invalid deprivation of a constitutional
guarantee of equality. Paul Farley, along with Timothy Tymkovich and
John Dailey in a recent issue of th University of Colorado Law Review,
condemns Evans as "one more example of ad hoc activist jurisprudence
without constitutional mooring."' The authors argued that the amendment
readily satisfied the Court's pre-Evans standards of rational basis review.
under the Equal Protection Clause and its contortions, they argue can only
be explained by the majority's desire to judicialize special legal protections
for homosexuals.
Now my purpose this afternoon is not to join the debate about gay,
lesbian, and bisexual rights and the Equal Protection Clause provoked by
the Evans decision, but to go at the case from another direction. While I do
not doubt that scholars writing about Evans have picked up something
important about the Amendment Two controversy, I believe they have
misstated what it is. I begin with the premise that I have argued more fully
elsewhere. That premise is this: [T]he starting point for American
constitutional analysis is not the substantive question of individual or
personal rights or group rights, but the structural question of political
power. A political power model best comports with the recognition that
American constitutionalism is first and focally about the arts of government
or the techniques of power which Michel Foucault calls "governmentality."
On this view, the primary function of constitutional adjudication is to
identify and check the illegitimate exercise of political power because power
2. Daniel Farber & Suzzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMM. 257
(1996).
3. Timothy M. Tymkovich et al., A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and Prejudice in the
Battle overAmendment 11, 68 U. COL. L. REV. 287, 333 (1997).
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is the medium in which politics lives and breaths and has its being.
Accordingly, instead of asking what Evans teaches us about the equality
rights of lesbian and gay citizens, I shall try to persuade you then that, at
base, the decision is not about rights at all. I propose instead to read Evans
as a judicial seminar about the requirements of republican law making. To
put the point in the terms of this panel, I want to argue that the core of the
controversy in Evans is most productively understood as a contest between
competing conceptions of republican self-government. By self-government,
however, I mean to denote something very different from democracy.
Now, to put the question this way requires more than a shift in accent
and emphasis in the way we talk about the Evans decision. It demands that
we bring an altogether different orientation to the case which focuses on
elements of Evans that are anterior to and thus elude the analytic of rights.
Although I can't elaborate these distinctions fully, it may help you while I
am talking to compare and contrast the two approaches by way of the
following propositions. Where rights-based constitutionalism focuses on the
subject or the individual actor, the political power model addresses itself to
questions with institutional structure and agency. Where rights-based
constitutionalism accords priority to matters of substantive right, the
political power model concerns itself with the substance of procedure.
My project proceeds as follows: I want to begin with a few observations
about the Evans majority opinion, reading it largely against the grain, with
a focus on Justice Kennedy's unsuccessful attempt to avoid the political
implications of the Amendment to the controversy. I want to trace that
failure not only to the instability of the terms in which Justice Kennedy
conducts his analysis, but in the language of Amendment Two itself. I then
want to develop, very briefly, a republican political argument against
Amendment Two. And, unhappily, I will not be able to give you the
critical account of the explicitly political defense of the amendment, which
Justice Scalia offers in his Evans dissent. That will have to wait another day.
Along the way, however, I do hope to argue that the strongest constitutional
case against Amendment Two can be found in the terms of the Guarantee
Clause. And, I want to explain why Evans presents a justiciable political
question. Now it is going to strike some folks in the audience that I am
making, certainly for me, an uncharacteristically formalist argument. I am
going to be talking about originalism and textualism; things that I usually
trash with great glee. But, this is a thought experiment on my part because
I want to finish by raising some questions about the uses and effects of
formalist argument as a strategy for progressive constitutionalism and that
will bring us back to some of the conversations we've had this morning.
In the opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concludes the
opening section with a few remarks about the constitutional grounds on
which Amendment Two was struck down by the Supreme Court of
Colorado. In its holding, he writes, the lower court held that Amendment
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Two was subject to strictest scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment
because it infringed the fundamental rights of gays and lesbians to participate
in the political process. While Justice Kennedy found it worthwhile to note
that the Colorado court had justified its holding by reference to the Supreme
Court's own case law regarding voting rights, and the discriminatory
restructuring of governmental decision-making, he took pains to make clear
that he and his colleagues were resting their affirmance of the supreme court
judgment on very different grounds. In short, although it agreed that
Amendment Two ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, the Evans
majority expressly declined to follow the logic of the lower court.
Accordingly, according to the majority, Evans could not and should not be
read to endorse the notion that the rights implicated by Amendment Two
were fundamental, that they involved political participation of a degree and
kind comparable to those at issue on the court cited cases. Or, that the
standard of review by which the constitutionality of the Amendment should
be assessed was the exacting standard of strictest scrutiny.
The central infirmity of Amendment Two was in a sense, and
paradoxically, less subtle and more shocking. The problem of Amendment
Two on Justice Kennedy's account was the problem of Plessy,/ to which he
adverts in the very first paragraph of his opinion. "One century ago, the
first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution 'neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.' Unheeded then, those words
now are understood to state a commitment to the law of neutrality where
the rights of persons are at stake. The Equal Protection Clause enforces this
principle and today requires us to hold invalid the provision of Colorado's
Constitution."' Amendment Two, in other words, ordains and establishes
an illegitimate regime of sexual apartheid. The chief constitutional defect of
Amendment Two, Kennedy writes later, is that "[it] classifies homosexuals
not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A state cannot so deem a class of
persons a stranger to its laws."6
In another passage of the opinion, Justice Kennedy introduces an
additional image to underscore his point that this is not a case about the
political but the legal consequences of Amendment Two. And that it is not
the political but the legal consequences of Amendment Two that render it
unconstitutional. Amendment Two, he writes, relegates gay men and
lesbians to the margins of civil society promoting their "exclusion from an
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. Evans, 517 U.S. at 623 (citations omitted) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(dissenting opinion)).
6. Id. at 635.
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ordinary civic life in a free society."'
For our purposes what bears remarking about the text of the Evans
opinion is Kennedy's inability to sustain the strict separation of law and
politics of civil life and political society that presumably distinguishes
analysis of Amendment Two from that of the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Let me explain what I mean. Although Justice Kennedy begins his opinion
by stressing that the Court's decision rests on grounds that are different
from the political participation theory staked out by the lower court, it
eventually becomes apparent that the Evans court cannot altogether escape
the political dimensions of Amendment Two.
In this connection, one of the more decisive moments in the text comes
towards the end of the opinion. Justice Kennedy has just noted
disapprovingly, the sheer breadth of the categorical character of the
amendment, which identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them
protection across the board. "It is not," he writes, "within our
constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central both to the idea
of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain
open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance."8 A few lines later he
casts the point in slightly different terms. "Respect for this principle
explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal
status or general hardships are rare. A law declaring that in general, it shall
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid
from government," a wonderfully capacious phrase, "is itself a denial of
equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."9
Now, one cannot help but note an ambiguity here, which may be traced
to the fact that among the parts of government that Amendment Two closes
off are the mechanisms of the legislative process. We cannot accept a view
that Amendment Two's prohibition on specific legal protection does no
more than deprive homosexuals of special rights. To the contrary, the
amendment imposes a special disability upon those persons alone.
Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek
without constraint. They can obtain specific protection against
discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the
state constitution or perhaps on the state's view by trying to pass helpful
laws of general applicability. Taken together these passages suggest that
despite their precise semantic differences Justice Kennedy's opinion and that
of the Colorado court may fairly be read as variations on a common theme.
One might call it the principle of open government. For Justice Kennedy
this principle of open government is one of the most basic terms of the
7. Evans, 517 U.S. at 631.
8. Id. at 633.
9. Id.
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social compact, which imposes an affirmative obligation on this state to
provide equal and impartial political access to government and each of its
parts. In suggesting that this obligation is inherent in the very idea of law,
the Evans majority opinion may be read to posit something like a
conceptual connection between purporting to be a government and keeping
the political process through which laws are made open to citizens.
Moreover, and this is a crucial rule, it need only take a small step from this
point to a related proposition.
The Court seems finally to embrace a conception of access to
government, which is unintelligible unless it also entails at least an implicit
recognition of an interest in political participation. Whether this claim or
interest can be described as a right or not is beside the point since the state
is still obliged to accord citizens equal concern, respect, recognition, and
protection. Why is Justice Kennedy unable to avoid the engagement with
the very political questions whose significance he seems so determined to
deny? I would suggest that the elements of an answer to this question must
be sought in the terms of Amendment Two itself. It is crucially important
in this connection to know precisely what Amendment Two did and did not
say and what it did and did not do. The Amendment was not merely an
ordinary statutory repeal of existing statutes, ordinances, or executive orders
prohibiting discrimination against gay men, lesbians or bisexuals. Nor was
Amendment Two merely a statutory prohibition against the future adoption
of ordinances forbidding discrimination against gay men, lesbians or
bisexuals. Amendment Two was an amendment to the Colorado State
Constitution. These features of Amendment Two without more are not
what rendered it constitutionally infirm.
It is here that we must shift our attention from the substance to theform
of the provision or rather to the content of its form. Like much of the
subsequent commentary on the case, the Evans opinion places great weight
on the injury Amendment Two inflicts on lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men.
Less emphasis has been given to the damage it inflicts on republican norms
regarding what Frank Michelman called today the "law of lawmaking"; what
I prefer to call the "rules of republican rule making." Consider, in this
regard, the Amendment's mode of address. Before it specifies a class of
persons against whom it shall operate, Amendment Two begins with a
command to the institutions of representative government. I'll read the
Amendment in full now.
Neither the state of Colorado through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation conduct, practices, or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any
persons or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota of
[Vol. 4:201
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preferences or protected status or claim of discrimination. 10
As its language suggests, before it even addresses the legal status of lesbian,
gay and bisexual Coloradans, Amendment Two undertakes a constitutional
reordering of the very forms of republican lawmaking. Stated another way,
Amendment Two achieves an across-the-board exclusion of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual Coloradans from the spheres of civil and political society by way
of a similarly comprehensive restriction on the practices of republican
government.
To appreciate the comprehensiveness of this latter restriction we must
direct our attention at this point to a concept that is the cornerstone of
republican political structure. I am thinking here, of course, of the concept
of representation, whose claim on the American political imagination is
older than the nation itself. In his magisterial study on the creation of the
American republic, Gordon Wood has persuasively demonstrated the almost
obsessive concern of the Framers to ensure that political representation
would operate as "the pivot"-the metaphor is Madison's-"on which the
whole American system moved."" Although the 1980s revival of civic
republicanism served to refocus our attention on the importance of
representation as a basic construct in our national government, it bears
remarking that political representation is also an equally central component
in the government of the states. So central in fact that it was one of the few
affirmative obligations to which the original Constitution bound the federal
government, vis-a-vis its relationship with the state or before Article IV,
section four provides that "the United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government.
In the modern period, we have come to view the Guarantee Clause as a
dead letter in American constitutional law, which cannot form the basis of
a justiciable claim. This, however, has not always been the case. In a 1994
article, to which I am deeply indebted, Erwin Chemerinsky quotes a passage
from John Harlan's dissent in Plessy, which found the Louisiana system of
state-mandated segregation railway travel unconstitutional on, among
others, Guarantee Clause grounds." Harlan denied the power of state
managers, these are his words:
"by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings
of freedom, to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of
race, and to place in a condition of inferiority a large body of American
10. Evans, 517 U.S. at 624 (quoting the text of the Colo. Const., art. III, S 30b).
11. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 597
(1969).
12. U.S. CONST. art IV, S 4.
13. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should BeJusticiable, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994).
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citizens, now constituting a part of the political community called the 'People
of the United States,' for whom, and by whom through representatives, our
community is administered. Such a system is inconsistent with the guaranty
given by the constitution to each state of republican form of government, and
may be stricken down by congressional action, or by the courts in the
discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme laws of the land
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.""
Chemerinsky demonstrates that it was not until the twentieth century
that the Court began to treat Guarantee Clause claims as non-justiciable
political questions. What is interesting for our purposes is the fact that the
waning of Guarantee Clause jurisprudence was roughly contemporaneous
with the rise of the referendum, the ballot initiative and other tools of
plebicitory politics of which Amendment Two was an instance.
Interestingly, too, a citizen initiated legislation and constitutional
amendment were a product of the turn of the century progressive
movement. These tools were devised to bypass the mechanisms of
representative government and give expression to the direct democratic will
to power. Since the beginning of this century, then, these two antagonistic
visions of political power have been on a collision course.
I hope by now to have said enough to prepare the ground for
specification of just what it is about Amendment Two that warranted its
invalidation on constitutional grounds. As I see it, the chief constitutional
problem in the Evans case may be found in the fact that Amendment Two
was an attempt to change the rules of the game of representative politics
without going through the process of representative politics. Amendment
Two fails to pass constitutional muster, not so much because it abridges the
right to participate in the political process. Our political process is not
participatory in any direct sense.
Republican or representative politics embodies at least three norms.
These norms can be called the norm of mediation, a norm of deliberation,
and a norm of accountability. Of course, they do not exhaust the
conceptual field of thinking on this matter, but they are the ones I want to
talk about. By mediation I mean to denote the artificial or aesthetic
character of political deliberation. There is a differentiation of citizens,
which marks the fact that political action takes place in the public sphere.
One might say that politics takes place on a stage and in drag in republican
government. Our point of reference here, at least in part, is not. But, I will
move on. The second norm is deliberation, which entails the discourse ethic
of debate, discussion, and reason giving. Ours, as Cass Sunstein has said, is
14. Id at 861 (quoting from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
563 (1896)).
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a republic of reasons and accountability."5 That is the third one, which
works on at least two levels. Representatives have to make and formally
report their decided positions on matters of substantive policy and they
must answer for that record to their constituents in periodic elections.
Taken together conforming with these three political norms is what makes
republican government republican. It's what makes the form or way of
political life in a republic, republican. To be sure, this process requirement
can be conceptually distinguished from the claim made by the Colorado
Supreme Court about the right to participate in the political process. The
distinction is between the structural requirement and individual rights.
The riddle of Romer v. Evans lies in the failure of a court and many
commentators to recognize that Amendment I raises questions first and
foremost about the structure of politics, and, only secondarily and
derivatively about the subject of politics. Who can change the rules of
representative politics and how? What are the rights of gay men, bisexuals,
and lesbian citizens? At least in the U.S. system, the domain of the political
entails a distinctive set of norms about the substance of the procedure for
following the conception-you might say-the concept of the form by
which the rules of the game of representative politics can be changed. If the
distinctive feature of American politics is its republican representative
character, one might go so far as to say that the referendum or rather the
ballot issue by which Amendment Two was added to the constitution, is not
a supplement to, but a subversion of, politics. From this perspective,
representation as has been recently put, is democracy.
My constitutional hook for this is, as I've suggested, the Guarantee Clause
and the small point here is that at least with respect to this narrow category
of norm-rules about the rules of representative politics-the Court ought
to, can and ought to, use the Guarantee Clause to enforce the guarantee of
republican government. It is a species of, if you will, representation
enforcement, and the endorsement of a certain kind of political ethics, the
makings of a distance or gap between the represented and their
representatives that is the hallmark of republican government. Insofar as
that right belongs to or can be attributed to a subject, that subject is the
subjectless structure of representative government itself. So you could say
that Article IV is a kind of postmodernist construct, since the guarantee runs
to the states and not to the people.
Now, my final question. The symposium brochure poses a question I'd
like to address by way of a final word about the implications of a formalist
argument such as I have made for progressive constitutional politics. That
question you will recall is this: what novel theories of progressive
constitutionalism can be formulated for deployment in the twenty-first
century? I'd like to reply to that question by way of a final word about the
15. CAss SuNSTEiN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993).
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implications of the formalist argument for progressive constitutional
politics.
You may have noticed that the case that I -have made has formalist
features. Is it conservative? Well I want to say no. I think not. And I do
so because I want to make a plea for a contextualist theory of progressive
constitutionalism. I want in short to insist that progressive constitutional
method recognizes that the particular strategy of constitutional argument
cannot be understood or assessed without reference, and I am paraphrasing
Fredric Jameson here, to the practical context in which alone its results can
be measured. To put the point another way, progressive constitutionalism
is most productively grasped as above all a strategy which holds that the
political aims and effects of constitutional discourses can never be
determined independently of their function in a given historical situation.
It's another way of making a point about contingency that Mark Tushnet
made in his presentation.
Roberto Unger has noted the ways in which those committed to
progressive political and legal ideals, like their liberal and conservative
adversaries, have tended to view the idea of representative democracy as
though it were equal to and exhausted by the peculiar combination of
eighteenth century liberal constitutionalism and nineteenth century party
politics that history has bequeathed them. This prejudice, the term is
ominous, has prevented them from forging an alternative conception of
representative democracy which sees the system of political representation
as a barrier to progressive constitutional practice. I want to suggest that the
notion that representative democracy and progressivism are hostile to one
another at all points can be sustained only if one ignores the situated
character of progressive constitutionalism. There is no necessary
correspondence between formalism and conservatism or between anti-
formalism and left politics. Thus within this conception of progressive
constitutionalism, my argument is not conservative, and I am willing to talk
a bit more with you about why I think that is so for reasons that I have not
yet stated. The point here, and for progressive American constitutionalism,
is that the context is all.
[Vol. 4:201
